Seminario:“Capital Structure Under Collusion” (with Daniel Ferrés, Gaizka Ormazabal and Paul Povel)

Presenta: Giorgo Sertsios (Universidad de los Andes) Lugar y hora: Miércoles 9 de Mayo de 2018, 13:00 hrs. Sala P 301, Edificio Placa (Diagonal Paraguay 257)


We study the financial leverage of firms that collude in their product markets by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower financial leverage during collusion years. This is consistent with the theory that low financial leverage helps make illegal cartel agreements more stable. The literature has largely ignored this possible role of capital structure, but understanding the decisions of cartel firms is important, given their surprisingly large economic footprint.

Datos del Evento

Fecha de inicio:
09 de Mayo, 2018 | 13:00 hrs.

Fecha de término
09 de Mayo, 2018 | 14:00 hrs.