Seminario “An Informational Ponzi Scheme”
Presenta: Francisco Silva (Ph.D. in Economics, University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)
Lugar y hora: 17 de Mayo, 12:30 pm, Sala P-301, Edificio Placa (Diagonal Paraguay 257)
Abstract: I show how "experts" who have no intrinsic ability or knowledge are able to sustain a permanent reputation that they do, even in a world where agents have rational expectations and access to an unlimited amount of data about the expert's predicting ability. The claim of having such knowledge attracts clients to the expert, allowing the expert to have access to the inside information they provide. That information can then be used by the expert to back up that claim.
Datos del Evento
17 de Mayo, 2019 | 12:30 hrs.
Fecha de término
17 de Mayo, 2019 | 13:30 hrs.