Seminarios
22
Mar
Seminario “Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms”
Presenta: Seth Zimmerman (Chicago Booth)
Lugar y hora: Esta semana se realizará el día Jueves 22 de Marzo de 2018, 13:30 hrs. Sala P 301, Edificio Placa (Diagonal Paraguay 257)
Abstract
This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances di er from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium e ects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households' belief accuracy. Allowing for belief errors reverses the welfare comparison to favor the deferred acceptance algorithm.
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Datos del Seminario
Fecha de inicio:
22 de Marzo, 2018 | 13:00 hrs.
22 de Marzo, 2018 | 13:00 hrs.
Fecha de término
22 de Marzo, 2018 | 14:00 hrs.
