Seminarios

25
Abr

“Trading for Bailouts” (with Toni Ahnert and Ana Elisa Pereira)

Presenta: Caio Machado (PUC) Lugar y hora: Miércoles 25 de Abril de 2018, 13:00 hrs. Sala P 301, Edificio Placa (Diagonal Paraguay 257)

 

 
Abstract
When deciding to bailout a firm, policy makers often rely on information contained in market activity to guide their decision. Since the benefits of those interventions are often more concentrated than the costs, some agents would like them to occur even when it is not socially optimal. Therefore, asset prices may reflect not only the market assessment of a firm's financial health, but also the strategic incentives of large and informed speculators with high stakes on the intervention. This paper proposes a model to understand how the presence of a large trader with high stakes in an intervention affects policy makers' ability to learn from prices and to implement the optimal policy.

Datos del Seminario

Fecha de inicio:
25 de Abril, 2018 | 13:00 hrs.

Fecha de término
25 de Abril, 2018 | 14:00 hrs.