Seminarios

Este viernes 28 de agosto, Damián Vergara  presentará su trabajo de investigación "The Effects of Ambiguity on Long-Run Cooperation", trabajo en progreso realizado en conjunto con Marco Rojas, cuyo resumen se encuentra más abajo.

El seminario se llevará a cabo este viernes 21 de agosto a las 13:00 hrs en la sala 1605 de la torre. Para confirmar almuerzo, favor de escribirle a Pamela Fuentes a más tardar el jueves a las 13:00 hrs al correo pamela.fuentes@econ.uchile.cl. 

Quienes quieran inscribir presentaciones para futuras sesiones, favor de escribir a damian.vergara.d@gmail.com.

The Effects of Ambiguity on Long-Run Cooperation
Marco Rojas Olivares, Damián Vergara Domínguez

Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Chile

Abstract
This paper studies the effects of ambiguity on long-run cooperation by analyzing the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and its application to Cournot’s duopoly model. We model ambiguity using neo-capacities, and conclude that regardless the level of optimism, higher levels of ambiguity decrease the likelihood of cooperation. The economic application suggests that in a static framework, the higher the ambiguity, the higher the competition, measured as total equilibrium quantities produced. The same is true in the dynamic version, by interpreting competition as the probability of collusion: the critical discount factor increases with the level of ambiguity, even being higher than one for some parametric combinations. Nevertheless, depending on the level of optimism, a discontinuity can arise when ambiguity is too high, emerging a situation when cooperation can be a potential short-run equilibrium.